2017-06-10
With its vast, complex
network of tributaries, the Mekong river system has been identified as a
valuable source of hydroelectricity generation from as early as the 1960s.
Today, the Lower Mekong Basin is a key site for large-scale hydropower dam
development,1
and it is estimated that it has the potential to generate 30,000 megawatts (MW)
of electricity for the region.2
Regional governments are considering
the construction of 88 more dams in the Lower Mekong River basin3 by
the year 2030. Over 120 dams are planned for the tributaries and 11 large-scale
hydropower dams are slated for the Lower Mekong mainstream, which has the
potential to produce over 13,000 MW of hydropower4.
While Thailand and Vietnam have already developed most of their tributary sites
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar currently possess the greatest potential for
hydropower resource development, and by the year 2030, they’re expected to
reach a combined percentage of hydroelectric generation of 96 percent5.
Meeting Demand
Faced with increasing
global energy prices, along with
inflated forecasts in energy demand, Thailand and Vietnam view hydropower as an
attractive, renewable resource that will not only help meet their exploding
energy demands, but also diversify their energy mix. Thailand’s total energy
consumption is 80 percent fossil fuel reliant, raising serious questions about
the country’s future energy security. For the less-developed host countries of
hydropower dams such as Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, hydropower represents huge foreign direct investment
opportunities and the potential for immediate GDP growth fueled by a rise in
electricity export revenues6.
The Laos government is billing itself as the “battery of Southeast Asia7”
with 60 generation projects planned for its tributaries and nine on the Mekong
mainstream8,
which forms a major component of its projected GDP growth of 7% per year9.
Large vs. Small Hydropower Dams
There are several types
of hydroelectric power plants and they vary in size. The Clean Development
Mechanism10,
under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, promotes “small” hydropower as a viable
alternative to large scale hydropower dams because they are more environmentally sustainable
and directly displace greenhouse gas emissions11.
The smallest CDM project12,
located in Bhutan, has a generation capacity of 0.1MW while the largest is a
1200MW capacity facility in Brazil13.
The CDM defines a hydropower project with an output capacity of 15MW or more as
“large”, while the European Union defines a large hydropower project as one
with an installed capacity greater than 20MW. Unlike large scale projects,
small hydropower projects are subjected to fewer regulations and assessments.
They often receive less scrutiny and tend to be viewed as individual projects
rather than as part of a series or “cascade” of dams in the region. Thus the
cumulative impacts of small dams are often neglected.
Regional Investment
Economic and energy
related development and security factors across the Mekong region have resulted
in a trend of “regional bilateralism”14,
where key decisions and investment deals regarding trans-boundary water
resource developments are largely made outside of international frameworks, and
instead remain cross-border between the strongest economies in the region
(Thailand and Vietnam) and the less industrialized, but resource-rich countries
(Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar).
Lower Mekong Basin hydropower projects
Take a tour of the
planned hydropower projects on the Lower Mekong's mainstream.
A range of private
investors, like national banks and multinational companies from China,
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, have formed hybrid private-public partnerships
with host governments to build hydroelectric dams in the Lower Mekong Basin
with the intent to purchase the bulk of that electricity. Only about 10 percent
of the hydroelectricity generated in Cambodia and Laos will remain in-country,
the rest intended for export15.
China has surpassed the World Bank as the biggest financier of large dams
globally, with about 25,000 dam projects worldwide, or half the world’s total16.
In Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, China has invested more than US$6.1 billion
between 2005 and 201117.
To date, much of Cambodia’s hydroelectric power expansion has been financed by
Chinese corporations, such as the state-owned Sinhydro – the world’s largest
hydropower developer18.
All the Lower Mekong
Basin countries are members of the Mekong River Commission, the only
inter-governmental body tasked with facilitating dialogue between all private
and public stakeholders in the region related to water governance, which grew
out of the 1995 Mekong Agreement19.
Despite these regional
processes, no consensus among MRC members needs to be reached for a dam to be
planned, approved, or constructed. This fact has led to several trans-boundary
disputes between the public-private dam builders and the people and governments who are downstream
from the hydropower dams and most likely to be affected by their construction.
Dam Diplomacy: Laos
The controversial Don
Sahong Hydropower Project is located on southern Laos on the Cambodian border and
is projected to generate 260 MW of electricity. The dam was the subject of an
MRC Special Session on Prior Consultation held on 28 January 2015, and
illustrates how the regional inter-governmental process works in practice. The
result of the six-month prior consultation process included the MRC’s technical
review and a series of recommendations including those of the remaining member
countries, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. In general, it was agreed that
information about the environmental and social trans-boundary impacts was
inadequate and an additional 6 month consultation time was required to study
the region properly. For its part, Laos issued the following concluding
statement: “Laos will continue to exercise its sovereign right to develop its natural
resources within its territory subject to the guiding principles of reasonable,
transparency and good faith.”
This is the second prior
consultation process the MRC has undertaken. The first was in September 2010,
when significant concerns by member countries were raised about the 1285 MW
Xayaburi Hydropower project, which is also located on the Mekong mainstream in
mountainous Northern Laos. At a cost of US$3.8 billion, the public-private
partnership between Thailand’s largest construction company CH-Karnchang, six
Thai commercial banks and the state-owned Krung Thai Bank, along with the
government of Laos, construction of Xayaburi was delayed in 2012 due to fierce
protests in Cambodia and Vietnam. Locally, the lack of early consultation and
information regarding the project’s impacts on the 202,000 people living and
working near the dam site was in question, as was the Laos government’s
resettlement of 2,100 people. Both MRC processes have concluded with Laos
making a unilateral decision to proceed with dam construction.
Environmental Impacts
Many of the concerns
raised by those opposed to the 11 mainstream hydropower projects are contained
in the MRC’s Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)20.
A critical appraisal of the planned 11 large-scale dams on the Mekong
mainstream, the 2010 report outlined key concerns echoed by local and
international civil society groups, as well as down-stream governments.
In weighing the economic
benefits against the environmental costs and the
impacts on communities, the key recommendation
of the SEA was to defer all mainstream dams for a period of up to ten years,
until further studies can be conducted to ensure all stakeholders are informed
of the risks. The MRC also warned that the likely costs and benefits of
hydropower dams on the Mekong mainstream are likely to be distributed
inequitably.
Some of the risks
highlighted in the assessment include the livelihoods
and food security of more than 70%
of inhabitants who rely on the fisheries, riverbank gardens, ecotourism
ventures, and fertile agricultural lands of the Mekong Basin for survival.
It is projected that the
cascade of 11 dams will transform 55% of the Lower Mekong into a chain of
stagnant reservoirs, which in turn will inundate the wetlands and terrestrial
ecology of the region, almost half of which is recognized as Key Biodiversity
Zones, and 5 percent of which is comprised of National Protected Areas and
Ramsar sites. The cost of agricultural production lost to
dam land inundation was found to be over US$5 million per year, while the
increase in the use of fertilizers due to changes in nutrient and sediment
trappings would result in a further US$24 million per year. The MRC report
states that the irrigation schemes proposed to mitigate these impacts would
generate US$15 million per year, resulting in a net economic loss in agricultural
production21.
Due to changes in the
Mekong River’s flow and habitat, around 100 species are at risk, including the
already critically endangered Irrawaddy dolphin and the Giant Mekong Catfish,
which could be driven to extinction. The loss of 26-42 percent of fish stocks
is estimated to cost the region US$500 million per year, and threatens the food
security of millions of people in the Lower Mekong Basin who rely on those
stocks for food and income. Such an outcome could exacerbate growing
inequalities in these developing economies and undermine national poverty alleviation goals.
Dam diplomacy: Myanmar
The seven planned Salween
dams in Myanmar will produce over 15,000 MW of electricity, which will then be
exported primarily to China and Thailand to raise the Myanmar government’s
revenues. Meanwhile, about 3 million households in Myanmar currently have no
access to electricity. On January 19, 2015 a petition urging the immediate halt
to the Salween River dam projects because they are fuelling armed ethnic
conflict in the region and violating the rights of local peoples. The petition
was signed by over 61,000 people and 131 organizations, including political parties.
The Salween River runs through the conflict zones of Shan State, Karenni State
and Karen State. In October 2014, the Burma Army launched an offensive near the
Hat Gyi dam site in Karen State which displaced 2,000 villagers. Fighting has
been ongoing near the Naungpha and Kunlong dam sites in Shan State. Under
former military rule, reports of human rights abuses due to government forces
trying to secure dam project sites by force, clearing areas of rebels and
ethnic villagers. Currently, Myanmar has 24 operational dams and is
constructing seven more. Preliminary agreements have been signed for a further
35 projects, and 4 development proposals exist. If totaled, Myanmar’s
hydropower generation would be 43,709 MW, up from the current 3,011 MW.
Related to hydropower
dams
References
1. International Rivers, ‘Mekong
Mainstream Dams Campaign’, http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/mekong-mainstream-dams;
http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/volume3/v3issue2/95-a3-2-18/file
2. This does not include China and the
Mekong’s hydropower potential within its borders, also termed the Upper Mekong
and known as the Lancang in China. It’s capacity is said to be 23,000 MW.
3. Pittock, J. 2014, “Devil’s
Bargain? Hydropower vs. Food Trade-Offs in the Mekong Basin”, World Rivers
Review Volume 29, pp.3 http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/8456
4. http://mekongriver.info/hydropower
(2010)
5. Roberts, D. ‘No More Dams on
the Mekong’, New York Times, dated September 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/opinion/no-more-dams-on-the-mekong.html?_r=0&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress®ion=FixedLeft&pgtype=article
6. http://mekongriver.info/hydropower
(2010)
7. Pittock, J. 2014, “Devil’s
Bargain? Hydropower vs. Food Trade-Offs in the Mekong Basin”, World Rivers
Review Volume 29, pp.3 http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/8456
10. Purohit, P, 2008, ‘Small hydro
power projects under clean development mechanism in India: A preliminary
assessment’, Volume 36, Issue 6, June 2008, Pages 2000–2015 http://www.iiasa.ac.at/publication/more_XJ-08-066.php
13. Hirsch, P. 2010. ‘The Changing
Political Dynamics of Dam Builsing on the Mekong’, Water Alternatives, Vol 3,
Issue 2, pp: 312-323, http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/volume3/v3issue2/95-a3-2-18/file
14. Roberts, D. ‘No More Dams on
the Mekong’, New York Times, dated September 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/opinion/no-more-dams-on-the-mekong.html?_r=0&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress®ion=FixedLeft&pgtype=article
17. Pye, D. ‘Power couple linked
to Sinohydro project’, Phnom Penh Post, March 13, 2014, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/power-couple-linked-sinohydro-project
18. ‘Agreement on the Cooperation
for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin’, 1995, http://www.africanwater.org/mekong_comments.htm
19. http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-holds-special-session-on-prior-consultation-of-don-sahong-hydropower-project/
21. http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-holds-special-session-on-prior-consultation-of-don-sahong-hydropower-project/
ICEM Australia, 2010,
‘MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of hydropower on the Mekong
mainstream, Hanoi, Viet Nam, http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Consultations/SEA-Hydropower/SEA-Main-Final-Report.pdf
Vrieze, P. ‘Optimism and
Concern Mark Burma’s First Workshop on Hydropower Dams’, The Irrawaddy, January
23, 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/optimism-concern-mark-burmas-first-workshop-hydropower-dams.html
